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REFLECTIONS ON THE ETHICS OF LEGAL
ACADEMICS: LAW SCHOOLS AS MDPS; OR,
SHOULD LAW PROFESSORS PRACTICE WHAT
THEY TEACH?
BRUCE A. GREEN*
[A member of the House of Commons said in Samuel
Johnson's presence] that he paid no regard to the arguments of
counsel at the bar of the House of Commons, because they were
paid for speaking. JOHNSON. 'Nay, Sir, argument is argument.
You cannot help paying regard to their arguments, if they are
good, If it were testimony, you might disregard it, if you knew
that it were purchased. There is a beautiful image in Bacon
upon this subject: testimony is like an arrow shot from a long
bow; the force of it depends on the hand that draws it.
Argument is like an arrow from a cross-bow, which has equal
force though shot by a child.'1
What law professor would spurn the opportunity, afforded by this
symposium, to offer personal reflections on the ethics of law
professors? Day after day, by profession, we hold a mirror up to the
law, legal institutions and lawyers. Now, we are invited to hold a
mirror up to ourselves and our colleagues. Anyone at all reflective
would jump at the chance. But, on further reflection, what law
* Louis Stein Professor, Fordham University School of Law. Gratitude is expressed
to Teresa Collett and the other organizers of, and participants in, the Symposium on the
Ethics of Law Professors at South Texas College of Law for which this contribution was
prepared, to participants in the Fordham Faculty Workshop who offered their suggestions
prior to the symposium and to Cathy Horta, Fordham Law '02, who provided valuable
research assistance.
1. IV JAMES BOSWELL, LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON, L.L.D. 281 (Yale University
Press, 1994).
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professor would willingly engage in this enterprise? Any problem we
describe will be presumed to come from our own experience. Any
criticism we level is sure to be turned back on us.
To resolve this dilemma, I offer the reflections of a
pseudonymous law professor. It should be understood that any
problem described in this work is entirely fictional. It should also be
understood that whatever views are expressed in this work do not
necessarily coincide with my own. In any case, like the arrow from a
cross-bow, the force of an argument should be the same regardless of
who sets it forth.
LAW SCHOOLS AS MDPs; OR, SHOULD LAW
PROFESSORS PRACTICE WHAT THEY TEACH?
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He who can, does. He who cannot, teaches. -George Bernard
Shaw.
I. INTRODUCTION
The subject of law professors' ethics lies at the intersection of
academic ethics and legal ethics. To focus on "law professors' ethics"
as a distinct area of concern is to recognize not only that law
professors' problems of academic responsibility may be different from
those of other academics because they are lawyers, but also that law
professors' problems of attorney conduct may be different from those
of other lawyers because they are academics. What makes law
professors' ethics different and interesting, however, is not simply the
I. 3 GEORGE BERNARD SHAW, Man and Superman, in SELECTED PLAYS WITH
PREFACES app.2, at 733 (1948).
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interrelationship and possible tension between academic and legal
ethics. It is also that law professors' problems of professional conduct
arise in an interesting and complex setting-namely, a law school. As
the legal profession debates whether lawyers should be allowed to
participate in multidisciplinary practices ("MDPs"), it should be
recognized that a law school is an example of an MDP and is
potentially prone to the kinds of problems that MDPs present.
The term MDP covers various ways in which lawyers might
combine with non-lawyers to offer a mix of legal and non-legal
services.' Several disciplinary rules currently forbid lawyers in private
practice from participating in some forms of profit-making MDPs.4
These rules are said to reflect at least three concerns.! The first is that
2. See generally Marjorie Meeks, Alter[ing] People's Perceptions: The Challenge
Facing Advocates of Ancillary Business Practices, 66 IND. L.J. 1031 (1991) (suggesting that
MDPs can exist without compromising standards of ethics or client service); Symposium,
The Future of the Profession: A Symposium on Multidisciplinary Practice, 84 MINN. L.
REV. 1083 (2000) (discussing current regulation as well as suggesting methods for future
regulation of MDPs); Symposium, Lawyers and Accounting Firms: Ethical Concern or
Model for the Future?, 20 PACE L. REV. 1 (1999) (considering the ethical ramifications of
MDPs); Gianluca Morello, Big Six Accounting Firms Shop Worldwide for Law Firms: Why
Multi-Discipline Practices Should Be Permitted in the United States, 21 FORDHAM INT'L
L.J. 190 (1997) (contending that the success of MDPs in other countries provides a model
for implementation of MDPs in the United States).
3. It has been argued, for example, that partnerships of lawyers and accountants
should be able to offer corporate clients a range of professional services, including legal
advice. See Hon. Charles L. Brieant, Is It the End of the Legal World as We Know It?, 20
PACE L. REV. 21, 29-31 (1999); Ronald A. Landen, The Prospects of the Accountant-
Lawyer Multidisciplinary Parternship in English-Speaking Countries, 13 EMORY INT'L L.
REV. 763, 819 (1999); Greg Billhartz, Can't We All Just Get Along? Competing for Client
Confidences: The Integration of the Accounting and Legal Professions, 17 ST. Louis U.
PUB. L. REV. 427, 447-50 (1998). Some would say that the "Big 5" accounting firms are
already doing so, in disregard of existing disciplinary restrictions. See Gary A. Munneke, A
Nightmare on Main Street (Part MXL): Freddie Joins an Accounting Firm, 20 PACE L.
REV. 1, 7 (1999) (observing that when lawyers charge that accountants are engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law, the accountants argue that they are not practicing law but
engaging in business planning which necessarily includes some legal elements); Morello,
supra note 2, at 190-92 (noting that, in countries that prohibit MDPs, the accounting firms
have circumvented the rule by forming alliances and agreements with law firms).
4. Among them are disciplinary rules which restrict lawyers from entering into
partnerships with non-lawyers, see MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b) (2000),
from splitting fees with non-lawyers, see id. R. 5.4(a), from being employed by corporations
to represent third parties, see id. R. 5.4(d), from aiding non-lawyers in the unauthorized
practice of law, see id. R. 5.5(b), and from compensating a non-lawyer for referring a client,
see id. R. 5.4(c). For a discussion of the restrictions' origins, see Bruce A. Green, The
Disciplinary Restrictions on Multidisciplinary Practice: Their Derivation, Their
Development, and Some Implications for the Core Values Debate, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1115,
1133-40 (2000).
5. Because profit-making MDPs have been forbidden since early in the 20th
century, there is limited empirical evidence about how for-profit MDPs would function in
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clients of an MDP may be misled or confused about whether they are
being assisted by a lawyer or a non-lawyer and whether they are
receiving legal or non-legal assistance.6 Additionally, lawyers may be
influenced to apply the wrong professional norms because they are in
an environment where different professional work is done (including,
possibly, by the lawyers themselves) in accordance with different, and
possibly conflicting, professional expectations.7 Finally, both the
lawyers and the non-lawyer professionals may be unduly influenced
by their stake in the success of the other's work.'
At bottom is a problem of ambiguity in the lawyer-client
practice and whether the disciplinary rules are really necessary to protect against the
various possible harms. Some point to what they perceive as recent abuses, however, to
justify retaining the rules in their present form. See, e.g., Lawrence J. Fox, Accountants, the
Hawks of the Professional World: They Foul Our Nest and Theirs, Too, Plus Other
Ruminations on the Issue of MDPs, 84 MINN. L. REV. 1097, 1103-04 (2000).
6. The fear is that clients may think they are receiving legal assistance from a lawyer
who is employing legal skill and comporting with the norms governing lawyers in legal
practice. But clients may not be getting what they expect, either because they are assisted
by a non-lawyer in the MDP or because they are assisted by a lawyer who believes that he
is providing a non-legal service, such as business advice, and therefore does not feel bound
to abide by the standards of conduct governing the practice of law. See, e.g., N.Y. State Bar
Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Formal Op. 557 (1984) (expressing concern that if a lawyer
and accountant entered into a partnership to engage in tax planning, clients might be
misled to believe that the accountant was providing legal services); cf N.Y. State Bar Ass'n
Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 687 (1997) (opining that a lawyer acting as an insurance
broker must take steps "to clarify that in recommending insurance products, [he] will not
be functioning as a lawyer and, thus, will not be exercising professional judgment as a
lawyer on behalf of the purchaser").
7. The traditional fear is that lawyers will be pressured overtly by the non-lawyers in
the MDP who are driven exclusively by a profit motive and are unconcerned about
lawyers' obligations to their clients and the public. See In re Co-operative Law Co., 92 N.E.
15, 16 (N.Y. 1910).
The relation of attorney and client is that of master and servant in a limited and
dignified sense, and it involves the highest trust and confidence. It cannot be
delegated without consent, and it cannot exist between an attorney employed by
a corporation to practice law for it, and a client of the corporation, for he would
be subject to the directions of the corporation and not to the directions of the
client. ... His master would not be the client but the corporation, conducted it
may be wholly by laymen, organized simply to make money and not to aid in the
administration of justice which is the highest function of an attorney and
counselor at law.
Id.
A more subtle danger is that the lawyers will simply assimilate the less demanding
ethics of the non-lawyers and apply it to all aspects of their work.
8. For example, if lawyers and accountants are partners, the lawyers may refer their
clients to the accountants, and the accountants may refer their clients to the lawyers,
regardless of whether the other professional services are needed and whether the other
professionals are best qualified to render them. This concern, in part, underlies the
disciplinary rule forbidding a lawyer from compensating non-lawyers for referrals. See
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 7.2(c) (2000).
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relationship. Although the most frequently discussed problem of
ambiguity is, "Who is the client?," the problem here is, "Who is the
lawyer?" In some contexts, ethics opinions and disciplinary
restrictions respond to this ambiguity by directing lawyers to be clear
about whether they, and others with whom they work, are serving as
lawyers or in some other professional role (e.g., as accountant or real
estate broker).9 In other contexts, the rules categorically forbid
lawyers from allying with non-lawyers so as to prevent the possibility
that the public might be misled or that lawyers might come under the
improper influence of non-lawyers.'"
For the most part, however, the restrictions are directed at
lawyers working in for-profit settings. Not-for-profit MDPs are
permitted. For example, a battered women's shelter whose principal
mission is to provide social services to its clients may establish a law
office to render legal assistance as well." Disciplinary rules and other
legal provisions that restrict for-profit MDPs are inapplicable or
provide an exception for not-for-profit institutions of this sort.
A law school is one form of not-for-profit MDP. Its principal
business is to provide a non-legal service: legal education. However,
through legal clinics, a law school's professors and students also
provide legal assistance to clients. The law professors who oversee
these clinics serve in a dual capacity as teachers and lawyers.
The array of legal and non-legal services provided within the law
school setting are not confined to the law school clinic. Law professors
are expected to engage in at least one other non-legal pursuit in
addition to teaching-namely, legal scholarship. Students at the law
school, besides being consumers of legal education, may themselves
render law-related services, including through volunteer student
groups that work in areas (e.g., welfare or unemployment
proceedings) where non-lawyers are permitted to render assistance. 3
9. See, e.g., N.Y. State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 687 (1997) (indicating
that a lawyer licensed as insurance broker may sell insurance to clients as long as the
lawyer makes it clear that, in the particular transaction, "he or she is acting exclusively as
an insurance broker and not as a lawyer").
10. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.4(b) (2000) (providing that a
lawyer may not practice law in a partnership with a non-lawyer).
11. See Paskowski v. DiBenedetto, 705 N.Y.S.2d 521, 523 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 2000); cf.
Ass'n of the Bar of the City of New York Comm. on Prof'l and Judicial Ethics, Op. 1997-2
(1997) (discussing ethical obligations of a lawyer employed by a social service agency to
represent minors as clients).
12. See, e.g., N.Y. JUD. § 495(7) (1983).
13. Raymond H. Brescia et al., Who's in Charge, Anyway? A Proposal for
Community-Based Legal Services, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 831, 844 n.64 (1998) (noting
that volunteer organizations at law schools often allow students to represent indigent
20011
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In their individual capacities, law professors who are licensed to
practice law may render legal services to clients. Indeed, they may be
encouraged to do so on a pro bono basis in order to serve as role
models for students who, it is hoped, will render pro bono services
themselves after they are admitted to the bar.
As far as MDPs go, law schools are unusual in at least one
respect. Ordinarily, an MDP would be expected to offer legal and
non-legal services to the same clientele. For the most part, however,
law schools offer their legal and non-legal services to different groups.
That is certainly true in the law school clinic, where the law school
serves clients who are typically unaffiliated with the school while
educating its students. In this setting, the school's dual mission may, at
times, become dueling missions. The clinical legal scholarship
acknowledges the complexities for clinical faculty, who may
experience a tension between their duty as lawyers to ensure that the
clinic's clients are competently represented and their mission as legal
educators to help students learn "by doing," including, at times, by
doing things poorly.'4
Even outside law school clinics, law faculty may encounter
questions arising out of the law school's role as an MDP and out of
their own dual role as lawyers and teacher-scholars. This article raises
three of these questions. First, do law professors, as lawyers, have an
obligation to supervise the law-related work of law students when it is
performed under the auspices of the law school? Second, may law
professors give advice to students who have law-related problems and,
if so, in the role as lawyer? Finally, what are the risks that the
professor's work as a lawyer will adversely affect the integrity of his
clients at administrative hearings); Martin Fox, Unemployment Law Clinic Finds Time Is
Now, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 18, 1992, at I (describing NYU's Unemployment Action Center, a
volunteer group that employs about 450 law students from several New York law schools);
Thomas J. Schoenherr, Mobilizing Students to Run Public Interest Programs at Law
Schools, Nat'l Ass'n for Law Placement, 8 BULLETIN 16, Sept. 1995 (explaining how law
schools set up student-run volunteer groups).
14. David Chavkin, Am I My Client's Lawyer? Role Definition and the Clinical
Supervisor, 51 SMU L. REV. 1507, 1527-28 (1998) (describing how a clinical supervisor
may refrain from intervening in a student's mistake so that the student will learn from it);
James E. Moliterno, In-House Live-Client Clinical Programs: Some Ethical Issues, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 2377, 2388 (1999) (explaining how, when faced with the decision of
whether to intervene in a student's case, a clinical supervisor is really deciding whether the
student's education is more important than the client's representation); Conference
Transcript: A Teacher's Trouble: Risk, Responsibility and Rebellion, 2 CLINICAL L. REV.
315 (1995) [hereinafter, A Teacher's Trouble] (presenting different hypotheticals in which
the clinical supervisor is faced with a conflict between the client's needs, the student's
needs, and the supervisor's own professional duties to the law school, the bar, and the
clinic's clients).
[Vol. 42:301
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work as a scholar and teacher, and how should the professor respond
to these risks? These questions are variants of the ones that lawyers
might expect to encounter in for-profit MDPs.
This article elaborates on these questions in the context of an
almost completely made up, fictional, hypothetical story. The story
illustrates the problems that law professors who are also lawyers may
encounter because of the multi-disciplinary nature of the law school
setting. This article does not set out to resolve the ethical questions
raised by the law school as an MDP and the law professor's dual role.
For the most part, its ambition is limited to calling attention to these
questions, underscoring their significance for law faculty and offering
some ways of thinking about them.
II. THE STORY
A. The Student's Dilemma
Professor Brown teaches legal ethics at New Upright School of
Law, a large metropolitan law school. New Upright takes a broad view
of its teaching mission. In addition to teaching legal analysis and legal
writing and research, imparting legal knowledge in core areas, and
encouraging students to take interdisciplinary approaches to legal
problems, New Upright strives to assist students in developing basic
legal skills (e.g., interviewing, negotiating, counseling, and advocacy)
through clinical courses, lawyering simulation courses, or internships.
The school also endeavors to train students in legal ethics and to
impart core professional values. Among the values that the law school
holds important is providing legal services to those who cannot afford
to pay for them. New Upright encourages unpaid service, in part,
through its Public Interest Support Center ("PISC"), which houses a
variety of student volunteer programs, many of which provide direct
services to low-income individuals with legal problems. The work of
these volunteer groups is loosely overseen by the director of the PISC,
who is not himself a lawyer, and by a faculty committee, the Student-
Faculty Public Service Committee, which meets twice each semester
to hear reports from the groups' student directors.
New Upright takes an equally broad view of its faculty's mission.
Its professors are expected to strive to be excellent teachers who
devote time to students outside as well as inside the classroom. New
Upright professors are also expected to be dedicated scholars. They
are expected to serve the law school through participation in faculty
2001]
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governance. And, they are expected to serve the community in some
way, whether it be through involvement in bar association activities,
pro bono work, drafting amicus briefs, or other personal or
professional contributions. Needless to say, the life of New Upright
School of Law, and the lives of its students and faculty, are busy ones.
At New Upright, Professor Brown teaches and writes primarily in
the area of legal ethics. He serves on the Student-Faculty Public
Service Committee. He also serves on a bar association committee
that deals with legal ethics questions and occasionally serves as an
expert witness or consults with lawyers about such questions. Each
year, Professor Brown invites his legal ethics students, if they ever
have a legal ethics problem, to seek his advice. Over the years, his
graduates have occasionally taken him up on the offer. Sometimes, his
current students do so as well.
One day, Professor Brown receives a visit from JB, a third-year
student enrolled in his legal ethics class. She is one of several directors
of the Public Housing Advocacy Project ("PHAP"), a student
organization housed in the PISC that assists public housing tenants in
eviction proceedings. Under state law, public housing tenants may be
assisted by a non-lawyer in administrative proceedings before the
Housing Authority's Administrative Law Judge ("AL"). Law
students, the PISC believes, may therefore provide this service
without a lawyer's supervision.
JB asks Professor Brown whether she may speak to him privately,
and, of course, he agrees. She explains that, one day earlier, she
accompanied AC, a second-year student, to an administrative hearing.
The Housing Authority sought to evict the Project's client, Mrs. P, on
the ground that her teenaged son had stolen a neighbor's television
set, which was discovered outside Mrs. P's apartment. AC's principal
argument was that, because Mrs. P's son was now in juvenile
detention and might well remain there, there was no need to evict
Mrs. P, even assuming her son had stolen the television. Therefore,
AC did not call his client as a witness. However, the Housing
Authority's lawyer did so and asked her whether her son had stolen
the television. She denied having any knowledge of the theft and
asserted that her son was not at home at the time the television was
stolen.
When the two students were alone after the hearing, JB
expressed concern that the ALJ did not appear to believe Mrs. P,
whereupon AC acknowledged that Mrs. P's testimony was false.
According to AC, at his first meeting with Mrs. P, she told him that
she came home one day, learned from her son that he had taken the
[Vol. 42:301
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neighbor's television, and insisted that he return it. He did not do so
but left it in the hallway outside the apartment. AC told Mrs. P that if
she gave that account at a hearing, she would lose her apartment. JB
got the impression from AC that he deliberately encouraged Mrs. P to
lie.
JB is outraged at AC and asks Professor Brown for advice about
what to do. She is concerned, on one hand, that the ALJ might
erroneously credit Mrs. P's false testimony and, on the other, that the
ALJ might reject an otherwise deserving legal argument because he
perceives her to be dishonest. JB thinks that Mrs. P might be most
sympathetic if she is revealed to be the victim of AC's bad advice. JB
wants to know whether she has some duty to correct Mrs. P's
testimony, since the ALU has not yet ruled. Even if she has no
obligation to do so, she wonders whether she may tell the ALJ that
Mrs. P had been encouraged to lie. She wonders whether she should
do so or whether she has some duty to keep quiet about what she
learned. JB is also infuriated that AC has betrayed the PHAP and the
law school and would like to see him kicked out of school and
banished from the legal profession. She wants to know whether she
can and should report AC's possible misconduct to the law school
administration and/or to the state's licensing authorities. Professor
Brown asks for some time to think about the problem and suggests
that JB return the next day.
B. The Professor's Dilemma
Professor Brown is uncertain what advice to give. For starters he
is not sure whether AC acted in a professionally or legally improper
manner. Certainly, AC could not properly encourage Mrs. P to give
false testimony; 5 doing so would, in all likelihood, make AC an
accessory to perjury. Under criminal law, even a non-lawyer is
forbidden from knowingly assisting in the creation of false testimony."
It is unclear from JB's second-hand account that AC did so, however.
Whether or not AC meant to encourage Mrs. P to lie, once she
testified falsely, did AC have a duty to the public or to the
administrative tribunal to correct the record? If he were a lawyer, he
might.'7 At the very least, he would have a duty to try to convince Mrs.
P to correct her false testimony.'8 But the disciplinary rules are written
15. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2000); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 210.00 (1999).
16. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2000).
17. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(4) (2000).
18. See id. R. 3.3(a)(4).
2001]
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for lawyers, and AC is not (yet) a lawyer. Non-lawyers are not
personally subject to sanction for violating the disciplinary rules. 9
Did AC's status as a law student, or the fact that he was acting
under the auspices of the law school, require him to abide by the
professional standards governing lawyers? Ordinarily, a law office has
an obligation to insure that its non-lawyers abide by the disciplinary
rules;21 for example, law offices must require their non-lawyer staff to
keep the confidences of the office's clients.2' Lawyers may be
sanctioned if the non-lawyers' misconduct is attributable to
inadequate supervision.22 Of course, ordinarily, law students are not
employees or agents of the law school;23 the law school generally does
19. The disciplinary rules of a given jurisdiction apply of their own force only to
lawyers who are licensed or practicing in the jurisdiction. Therefore, in the ordinary course,
they do not apply to law students. Where law students or other non-lawyers act in the
employ of lawyers who are rendering legal services, the lawyers must take steps to ensure
that the non-lawyers act consistently with the lawyers' professional obligations. See, e.g.,
MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.3(a) (2000). As employees the non-lawyers
would have a fiduciary duty to comport with the applicable disciplinary rules as directed by
the lawyers who supervise them in the course of the representation.
When students render legal services in a law school clinic, the court rules that
authorize them to do so may require them to comport with the disciplinary rules. Insofar as
they act as an agent of a law professor or other lawyer in a matter, they may similarly have
such an obligation even if no such rules apply. One might argue that, when law students
render law-related services in contexts where non-lawyers are permitted to serve (e.g.,
certain administrative proceedings or small claims court), they should be held to the
standards of conduct governing lawyers in a legal representation. Arguably, a gross
deviation from certain professional standards might reflect that the student lacks the
requisite "character" to practice law and might therefore justify denial of admission to the
bar. At present, however, it is uncertain whether, absent a voluntary undertaking, law
students must comport with the professional standards when they perform law-related
work independently of a clinic or law office. Cf Leonard Biernat, Why Not Model Rules of
Conduct for Law Students?, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 781, 804-23 (1985) (presenting
proposed model rules of conduct for law students, taken partly from the ABA rules and
partly from the codes of conduct of individual law schools); Adrienne Thomas McCoy,
Student Advocates and Conflicts of Interest, 73 WASH. L. REv. 731, 731-33 (1998)
(proposing a rule that applies attorney conflict of interest rules to law students working in
legal clinics or legal advocacy groups).
20. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.3(a) (2000).
21. See id.
22. See id. R. 5.3(c).
23. Cf Hansen v. Kynast, 494 N.E.2d 1091, 1092 (Ohio 1986) (holding that
a student who attends a university of his choice, receives no scholarship or
compensation, voluntarily becomes a member of the university lacrosse team
which engages in intercollegiate contests with other universities for which games
no attendance fee is charged, who purchases his own equipment and who
receives instructions from a coach while preparing for and playing such games,
but is not otherwise controlled by the coach, and who participates in the game as
a part of his total educational experience while attending school, is not the agent
of the university at the time he is playing the game of lacrosse).
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not act through its law students, and its law students have no fiduciary
duty to the school. Must New Upright nevertheless police its students'
conduct when they are rendering assistance under the auspices of law
school volunteer programs, to ensure that the law students are
comporting with the norms that would ordinarily apply to lawyers?
Would the public, the courts, or law-school accrediting authorities
reasonably expect it to exercise such oversight? Even if the law school
did not explicitly require its student volunteers to hold themselves to
the professional standards governing lawyers, did AC have some
implied obligation to the law school to do so?
What about AC's duty to Mrs. P? AC has not acted with the skill
that one would ordinarily expect of a lawyer. A competent lawyer
would take steps to prevent a client from testifying falsely, not
encourage the client to do so.24 Of course, AC is not a lawyer.
Presumably, he told Mrs. P that he was not a lawyer when they first
met. But is that enough to prevent an unsophisticated client from
reasonably expecting him, as a law student, to provide better quality
assistance than she would receive from a neighbor or friend who has
no legal training? Surely, a person who received medical care at a
teaching hospital from a medical student would expect essentially the
same level of care as she would receive from a doctor. Regardless of
whatever disclaimers are made, wouldn't someone in need of legal
assistance who receives help from a law student at a law school expect
to receive the same quality of assistance that she would receive from a
lawyer? If so, is the law school in some sense responsible for
misleading Mrs. P? Does it have a responsibility now to step in and
make amends, as well as to protect other members of the public from
being ill-served by its students in the future? Or is it sufficient that, on
average, tenants served by the PHAP are better off than if they had to
represent themselves, which is their likely alternative?
What about JB's obligations? May she correct Mrs. P's false
testimony or report AC for failing to do so? Must she do so on the
theory that she, too, ought to comply with the disciplinary rules, which
might require a lawyer in her position to correct the record?" Was
Mrs. P her client, either because she accompanied AC in the role as"co-counsel" (or its equivalent) or because she is a member of the
PHAP, the "law office" (or its equivalent) responsible for
representing Mrs. P? If so, is she obligated to keep what she learned
confidential, on the theory that if she were a lawyer, her reporting
24. See Bruce A. Green, Lying Clients: An Age-Old Problem, 26 LITIG. 19, 24 (1999).
25. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.3(a)(4) (2000).
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obligation would be trumped by her duty not to disclose information
about the client?26 Are the answers to these questions governed by the
standards of conduct that apply to lawyers? If not, what is the
applicable standard? And, assuming that JB has some options, what
should she do?
In the past, Professor Brown has thought about the reporting rule
in various other contexts. He has consulted with lawyers, sometimes
for a fee but often not, about whether they must report another
lawyer's apparent misconduct. He has addressed this question in the
course of his work with a bar association committee that gives advice
to lawyers with ethics questions. Of course, he has addressed this
question in his teaching, including in continuing legal education
programs for practitioners. His reflections are influenced by his prior
work, although, he muses, this is a different situation. Assuming JB is
subject to the disciplinary rules, including the reporting rule,27 is the
rule inapplicable because AC is not a lawyer, or might there be a duty
to report to the admissions authorities? Would the rule be
inapplicable because AC's transgression does not call his fitness to
practice law into question?" Is JB barred from reporting AC's
conduct because she has a duty to Mrs. P to keep what she knows
confidential? 21 Is she, in effect, co-counsel for Mrs. P? If not, does she
nevertheless have some confidentiality obligation to AC, given his
likely expectation that he could confide in her? Even if she might
otherwise have been obliged to keep the confidence, may she disclose
what she learned to prevent a fraud on the tribunal?3"
On one hand, Professor Brown thinks, JB is not a lawyer; she is
therefore not subject to the state's disciplinary provisions, and so she
can do whatever she wants. On the other hand, Professor Brown
identifies reasons why she might be obligated to act consistently with
the applicable provisions or, even if not obligated to do so, might want
to. As a law student who assists clients with legal problems under the
auspices of a law school volunteer program, she may have impliedly
undertaken to act consistently with the applicable professional
standards. Perhaps, when she was initially trained to do this work, she
explicitly agreed to comport with the professional standards. Perhaps
she is, loosely speaking, acting under the supervision of faculty who
are lawyers and for that reason might have to act according to the
26. See id. R. 1.6(a).
27. Id. R. 8.3(a).
28. See id.
29. See id. R. 1.6(a).
30. See id. R. 3.3.
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legal profession's norms.
Professor Brown is concerned about JB's interests as well as her
obligations. He worries that if she reports AC's conduct, she will
become embroiled in unpleasant proceedings and become a pariah in
the legal community. But, if he advises her not to do so, will she
become cynical about how lawyers (and future lawyers) conduct
themselves and about the standards governing lawyers' conduct?
Professor Brown is also concerned about the law school's
interests. He worries that, if AC's conduct is discovered, the
reputation of the law school and its public interest program will be
seriously harmed. He worries that, if the law school does not
intervene, and its failure to do so is later discovered, it will come
under even greater criticism for countenancing professional
misconduct.
Professor Brown is also concerned about the interests of justice.
He worries that, if Mrs. P's false testimony is not corrected, the
administrative proceeding may be influenced unfairly, because,
contrary to JB's expectations, the AI_ may believe it. If the false
testimony is corrected, the ALJ may order Mrs. P's eviction,
notwithstanding that her lies were encouraged by a law student in
whom she had placed her trust. JB may be naive to think that the ALJ
will weigh this information in the client's favor.
Professor Brown briefly reflects that he does not feel very
concerned about AC's interests, but he wonders whether he should.
Professor Brown has never met AC; it is easy to think of him as a
faceless abstraction. But, Professor Brown muses, AC is a student of
the law school. The law school must take account of his interests.
Must a law professor do so as well? Must he seek out AC, listen to his
side of the story, and offer him advice? Professor Brown is inclined to
think that he already has his hands full.
Assuming that neither AC nor JB take any action, Professor
Brown wonders whether he will have a personal obligation to call the
problem to someone's attention. Perhaps the law school
administration would want to know. Besides the possibility that the
law school might have an institutional responsibility or desire to
correct the record in the administrative proceeding, it might want to
consider taking disciplinary action against AC or calling his possible
misconduct to the attention of the licensing authorities when he
applies for bar admission so the authorities consider whether he has
the requisite character to practice law. Additionally, if it were aware
of AC's conduct, the law school might reevaluate the PISC and the
work of volunteer groups. Perhaps it would require students to be
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trained and supervised more closely by attorneys. Perhaps it would
require the volunteer groups to take exquisite care in advising clients
to make sure no client expects them to act as capably as lawyers or to
adhere to the legal profession's norms. Of course, such advice might
impair the groups' effectiveness by undermining their clients'
confidence in the students.
In mulling over what steps he personally might take, Professor
Brown considers whether he is under any obligation to keep what JB
told him confidential, unless she later authorizes him to disclose it in
some fashion. In JB's understanding, was she coming to him as a
lawyer, a teacher, neither, or both? It is not unlikely that JB regarded
him as a lawyer. His students know that, on occasion, he gives advice
to lawyers about their professional problems.
If JB came to him as a lawyer, Professor Brown wonders, does he
owe her a duty under the disciplinary rules to keep her information
confidential?3 Or would she have understood that the law school is,
essentially, a "co-client" with whom he would be permitted to share
what she told him?32 Even if JB approached him only as a teacher,
Professor Brown thinks he might be morally bound to keep JB's
information secret because he agreed that she could talk in private.
Alternatively, he considers whether, as an employee of the law school,
he has a fiduciary duty to disclose what he has learned to the law
school administration because the information may be important to
how the law school functions, including how it supervises students and
how it carries out its responsibility to the licensing authorities.
Further, Professor Brown considers whether the nature of the
advice he provides should differ depending on whether he is serving as
JB's teacher, as JB's lawyer, or simply as a concerned acquaintance.
As a teacher, he might be influenced by the law school's institutional
interests or by his own interests as a scholar. Certainly, teachers are
entitled to bring these interests to bear in their role as teachers. But, if
he is acting as a lawyer-JB's lawyer-he owes her a duty of
undivided loyalty. He must give advice designed to serve her
interests exclusively, not those of his law school or his own.
Then he wonders, if JB has come to him as a lawyer and is
expecting to receive legal advice, can he advise her at all? Isn't there
too great a risk that whatever advice he provides will be influenced,
31. See id. R. 1.6.
32. See Am. Special Risk Ins. Co. v. Delta Am. Ins. Co., 634 F. Supp. 112, 121
(S.D.N.Y. 1986) (recognizing that, ordinarily, co-clients understand that information
imparted to the lawyer by one client may be shared by the lawyer with the other client).
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958).
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even if in subtle and unconscious ways, by the interests of the law
school, to whom he owes fiduciary duties as an employee, by his own
interests as a legal ethics teacher, and by his own interests as a scholar
who might one day write about JB's problem? There is a possibility
that his advice will be influenced in one direction or another by his
concern for the law school's various interests, including its reputation.
There is a danger that, as a legal ethics professor, he will be influenced
to urge the "high-minded" course-namely, disclosure-even if JB
will suffer as a consequence. As an academic, he may be tempted to
urge a course of conduct that leads to public disclosure, thereby
reducing the need to keep the whole story confidential.
In hindsight, Professor Brown thinks that perhaps he should have
made it clear to JB that he was not going to give her advice as a
lawyer. He considers whether it is too late to make that clear now. If
he is to function as a lawyer, should he advise JB about his conflict of
interest?34 Even if she understands and still desires his advice, may he
provide it?
C. The Professor's Response
Professor Brown does his best to respond appropriately to the
problem presented by JB's visit to his office.
D. The Professor's Post-Script
Some time later, Professor Brown receives an invitation to
participate in a symposium on law professors' ethics. He finds himself
reflecting on AC's conduct, JB's predicament, and his own and
wondering whether it might be useful to others or cathartic for himself
if he were to explore aspects of this problem in a law review article.
He muses that the situation raises a host of difficult questions of
personal, professional, and institutional ethics. Examining it in writing
would provide an opportunity to draw on his experience as a
teacher-and, apparently, a lawyer-for the benefit of his scholarship.
Surely, his treatment of this problem will be richer for his having
experienced it first-hand. And his discussion of the problem might
benefit those who encounter it later, or even influence law schools and
law faculty to develop ways to avoid the problem that he encountered.
Thus, an article on the subject might have some practical utility.
Professor Brown wonders, however, whether he can address this
34. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CODUCT R. 1.7 (2000).
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situation in a scholarly way with sufficient scholarly objectivity. He
knows that he had limited time in which to respond to JB's dilemma.
He certainly did not have as much time to reflect on the problem, to
turn it over in his head and explore it from every angle, as he will now
have when he approaches it from a scholarly perspective. But will he
be unduly influenced by the quicker judgment that he previously
made? When he discusses the problem with other professors and
receives their critiques, will he ignore their criticisms out of a desire
for self-vindication?
It occurs to Professor Brown that he would not want to disclose
in an article that the problem actually arose at his own institution,
much less that he personally grappled with it. If he did so, JB might
feel betrayed or embarrassed, and his law school might be
embarrassed as well. If he offers a hypothetical to make the issues
concrete, he might have to alter his experience in various ways and
make clear that the story is an almost completely made up, fictional,
hypothetical one. But might he be accused of intellectual dishonesty if
he does so? Would he have an obligation to disclose that some views
expressed in the article were previously developed in the course of
advising JB or in the course of assisting others who sought advice
about whether to report another lawyer's misconduct?
Professor Brown decides to avoid the need for disclosure by
withholding his own views. He will simply raise questions and identify
arguments without endorsing any. Over the course of the ensuing
weeks, he produces the following draft.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following scenario. One day, Beth Jackson ("BJ"), a
law student, comes to the office of Professor White, her legal ethics
professor. She appears upset. BJ asks to speak privately, and he
agrees. She then explains that she works with another student, Charles
Albright ("CA"), in a volunteer program where students without
lawyer or faculty supervision assist applicants for social security
benefits in administrative hearings. She has learned that CA
encouraged a client to submit a false affidavit. BJ does not know what
to do. After hearing the full story, Professor White asks for time to
give the matter some thought and arranges to meet with BJ the
following day.
In this scenario, does Professor White have any personal
responsibility to respond to what he has been told about CA's
conduct? How should he advise the student who requested his help?
And, when the matter is resolved, may he draw upon this experience
in his teaching and scholarship? All of these questions emerge out of
the law school's status as, in effect, a multidisciplinary practice
("MDP") in which a mix of legal, law-related, educational, and
scholarly activities take place, as well as the law professor's status as,
in effect, a "dual practitioner." The answers may be less certain than
they initially seem.
II. THE ROLE OF NON-LAWYERS (LE., STUDENTS) AS LEGAL
PROVIDERS: Do LAW PROFESSORS HAVE A DUTY TO PROTECT THE
PUBLIC FROM THEIR STUDENTS?
It is tempting for law professors to view themselves as entirely
autonomous-as independent contractors who in their teaching,
scholarship, and legal work have professional independence from
others at the law school and, at the same time, have no responsibility
for the work performed by others in the law school setting. The first
half of this conception seems almost reasonable, if overstated.
Certainly, insofar as they engage in private law practice on the side,
law professors are independent. Unless they are affiliated in some way
with a law office outside the law school, they are solo practitioners'
1. Although they are housed in the law school, the law professors may compare
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and, in either case, are independent of the law school administration
and academic colleagues. As scholars law professors have autonomy-
that is, "academic freedom"-to decide what views to espouse. Even
as teachers, law professors have considerable freedom, although the
law school may impose various obligations and constraints in light of
the law school's own responsibility as an educational institution.
It is not clear, however, that law professors are equally free to
ignore the conduct of others within the law school. Law professors,
after all, participate in the governance of the law school and have a
responsibility as professors to do so. Insofar as law schools have
responsibilities to their students and the public-including a
responsibility to ensure that its graduates are qualified to become
lawyers-law professors have some responsibility to govern the school
in a way that enables it to fulfill these responsibilities. To what extent,
however, do law professors, because they are lawyers, have different
or additional responsibilities to supervise the conduct of others? If
one views the law school as something akin to an MDP, do law
professors, as lawyers, have some responsibility to ensure that law
students properly conduct their work for clients, just as law firm
partners must take steps to ensure that both lawyers and non-lawyers
at the firm properly conduct their work?2 If so, to what standard
should students be held?
The answers are not entirely clear even with respect to law school
clinics, where students are supervised by lawyers who are licensed to
practice in the jurisdiction and who may serve as co-counsel in the
case. Even if the students represent clients in administrative contexts
in which non-lawyers are permitted to appear on a party's behalf, the
law students in the clinical setting are expected to exercise the
customary skill of lawyers and to comport with the rules of
professional conduct applicable to lawyers. Law professors teaching in
the clinic have a direct supervisory responsibility as teachers and
lawyers to see that the students do so. At the same time, one might
expect the law faculty as a whole to have a general responsibility to
ensure the proper functioning of the clinics. However, it is not entirely
clear how extensive that responsibility is or how it can be carried out
in the face of clinical professors' claim, as professors, to academic
freedom, and the obligation of the clinics, as law offices, to preserve
themselves to private solo practitioners who share a suite of offices, a common library,
conference room, copying facilities, and the like.
2. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.1, 5.3 (2000).
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lawyer independence and client confidentiality.3 Perhaps the answer is
that, as long as the faculty hires qualified clinical professors and no
problems later come to its attention, it has discharged its
responsibility.
The faculty's responsibility is even less clear with respect to the
work of students in a volunteer program. Must law schools require
student volunteers to conduct themselves as lawyers, even while
disclosing to "clients" that they are not, in fact, lawyers? If so, must
law schools make sure that the students are adequately trained and
supervised? If so, what are the responsibilities of the law faculty to see
that this occurs?
For any number of reasons, law schools may be inclined to allow
students to run volunteer programs with minimal supervision from
lawyers. The law school may lack the resources to provide the level of
supervision that is customary in a clinic. Further, the law school may
believe that subjecting students to a lawyer's supervision will
undermine student interest and initiative. Therefore, the law school
may take the view that, as long as the students are not holding
themselves out as lawyers and as long as they are providing assistance
in administrative settings in which non-lawyers are permitted to
appear, the students should run the show. In that way, the law school
can provide an expanded number of pro bono opportunities-
including opportunities for first-year students who are not yet eligible
to take clinical courses-and encourage an appreciation of pro bono
service that, ideally, will last a professional lifetime.
One problem that this poses is that the law students may not
serve their clients very well. They may give bad advice, conduct
inadequate investigation, present the client's case poorly in the
administrative proceeding, or entirely neglect the matter. Clinical law
professors are familiar with these risks and can take steps to avert
them.' It is doubtful that these shortcomings are as easily avoided in
the student volunteer setting. Another problem is that the students
3. See id. R. 1.6, 5.4.
4. See David Chavkin, Am I My Client's Lawyer? Role Definition and the Clinical
Supervisor, 51 SMU L. REV. 1507, 1527-28 (1998) (explaining that clinic supervisors have a
responsibility to make sure that the students do not make serious mistakes in a client's
representation); James E. Moliterno, In-House Live Client Clinical Programs: Some
Ethical Issues, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 2377, 2388 (1999) (describing three situations in
which a supervisor may have to intercede in a student's representation of a client: the first,
where the student fails to account for the statute of limitations on a client's claim; the
second, where the student in her research has misinterpreted a case that seriously affects
the representation; and the third, where the student treats a client with disdain and
insensitivity).
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may not serve in accordance with the legal profession's ethics
standards. Indeed, they may not even abide by the law.
Is any of this the law school's problem? It may be, for at least two
reasons. First, the students are operating under the law school's roof.
The fact that the students are working in a law school setting may give
rise to expectations on the part of the client, the administrative law
judges, and lawyers with whom the students interact, and the public in
general. Even if everyone knows that the students are not licensed to
practice law, others may expect them to function as skillfully and
ethically as lawyers, and this expectation may well be a fair one. The
law school may have a moral responsibility to take whatever steps are
reasonable to ensure that its students meet these expectations. If a
malpractice case is ever brought, the law school may discover that it
has a legal responsibility as well.
Second, a law school has a responsibility to the licensing
authorities to identify students whose conduct may call into question
whether they have the requisite character to practice law. A law
school may not turn a blind eye when a student submits a plagiarized
paper or engages in other academic misconduct. Nor may it ignore
that a student has acted deceitfully or engaged in other conduct that
would be regarded as serious professional wrongdoing. If the law
school knew that its student knowingly submitted a false affidavit in
an administrative proceeding, it would surely have a responsibility to
notify the licensing authorities when the student applied for admission
to practice, if not to institute internal disciplinary proceedings.
Assuming this is the law school's problem, it may also be the
professor's problem. This is most obviously so when the professor
learns of a particular wrongdoing within the volunteer program.
Assuming the professor is a lawyer, he is subject to disclosure
obligations of his own.' Whether or not a disclosure obligation has
been triggered, as a law professor generally or as a legal ethics
professor in particular, he may be disposed to act with a high degree
of "professionalism," including by voluntarily promoting the sound
functioning of the justice system and the lawyer admissions process.
This may mean taking steps to alert a tribunal to a possible fraud or to
notify the licensing authorities of possible misconduct on the part of a
future applicant, even when the professor has no legal responsibility
to do so.
Additionally, the professor is an employee with fiduciary
responsibilities to the law school. Professors may be expected to
5. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 8.3 (2000).
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disclose information that the law school needs to carry out its own
responsibilities. From the law school's perspective, receiving this
information may be of legal and practical importance. For at least
some legal purposes, the institution's "knowledge" is the sum of what
its officers and employees know.6 If this is so, then the professor's
knowledge may be imputed to the law school, whether or not the
administration is aware of it.
The more difficult question is whether law professors,
individually and collectively, have an affirmative obligation to learn
what law-related work is being performed within the law school and to
ensure that it is being done ethically. If one analogizes a law school to
a law firm, and a law professor to a law firm partner, law professors
would seem to have a responsibility to oversee students in their law-
related work, just as partners must oversee the conduct of non-lawyer
personnel.7 Are these analogies fair ones? From the perspective of the
volunteer program's client, the students' work may not appear to be
distinct from that of the law school which enrolls them, educates them,
houses them, and provides them computers and telephones. Further,
insofar as the law school itself has a responsibility for students' work,
it seems questionable whether law professors, given their shared role
in law school governance, can entirely abdicate this responsibility to
the law school administration any more than can individual partners
abdicate to the law firm's managing partners. Even assuming that law
professors have some professional or, at least, moral responsibility to
oversee students' law-related work, to what standard should law
students be held? Must law students do anything more than comply
with the law? In a law firm, non-lawyers must act consistently with the
professional obligations of the lawyer, but that is because they are
acting as the lawyers' agents.8 If law students are acting on their own,
it is unclear whether they must act consistently with the law
profession's standards.9
At bottom the notion of law student public-interest organizations
seems paradoxical. On one hand, unless the student organizations are
supervised closely by lawyers, the law school and its faculty cannot
fulfill whatever obligation they may have to protect the public by
ensuring, among other things, that the students make it clear to
prospective clients that they are not licensed practitioners and will not
6. See, e.g., Hanon v. Dataproducts Corp., 976 F.2d 497, 507 (9th Cir. 1992).
7. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 5.3 (2000).
8. Cf. id. R. 8.4(a) (providing that a lawyer may not violate the rules of professional
conduct through the acts of another).
9. See infra, Part II.
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necessarily be rendering the same quality of assistance as a lawyer
would. On the other hand, the more closely the law students are
supervised, the more reasonable it is for clients to expect the law
students to be supervised well, to be qualified to render assistance in
the particular matters, and to do so essentially as a lawyer would.
Given the vast unmet legal needs of the low-income communities,
there is a strong impulse to encourage law students to voluntarily
serve low-income clients in matters where non-lawyers are permitted
to render assistance. The challenge for law schools and law faculty is
to determine how best to support students' volunteer work in a
manner that faces up to the problems and the risks this work poses.
III. THE ROLE OF LAW PROFESSORS AS LAWYERS: MAY LAW
PROFESSORS ADVISE STUDENTS WITH LEGAL PROBLEMS?
When a student comes to a lawyer-professor for advice relating to
a legal problem, does the student expect the professor to serve as a
lawyer? Does the student expect the professor to serve as a teacher-
or, to use Teresa Collett's phrase, as a "professor-mentor?""' Or does
the student simply regard the professor as a concerned and caring
older person who is possessed of uncommonly good judgment? How
does the professor himself envision the role? And what are the
implications of adopting one role or the other? These questions may
come up in any number of contexts, and sometimes the context will
suggest what role the professor is, or should be, adopting."
These questions may arise in the classroom setting. For example,
students encountering personal legal problems may ask the professor
a question during or after class. If the student does not disclose that
the question relates to the student's personal concerns, the professor
will fairly understand that the student is approaching him as a teacher,
not a lawyer. Therefore, the student cannot fairly rely on the answer,
apply it to her own problem, and, if the answer turns out to be
unhelpful, complain that the professor has acted incompetently as a
lawyer or engaged in legal malpractice. The law professor's role is less
clear, however, if the student indicates that the question relates to a
real legal problem. There is a danger that, if the professor provides
the requested advice, the student may think that she can fairly rely on
it. The professor may inadvertently have created a lawyer-client
10. Conference Transcript, A Teacher's Trouble: Risk, Responsibility and Rebellion, 2
CLINICAL L. REV. 315, 333 (1995) [hereinafter, A Teacher's Trouble].
11. It should be recognized that similar questions may arise when law professors are
consulted by their colleagues. Those questions are not addressed~here, however.
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relationship by implication, 2 with the result that the professor may be
accountable if the student relies on the advice to her detriment
because the advice is erroneous, incomplete, or inapplicable to her
actual problem.'3
These questions may also arise in the clinical setting. For
example, a program presented several years ago by clinical professors
and legal ethics professors discussed the scenario in which a student
seeks advice from a clinical professor concerning both the student's
possible malpractice in the clinic and the misconduct of a different
clinical professor who is her supervisor.'4 Several participants in the
program noted the uncertainty about the student's expectations and
suggested that the professor should clarify, preferably at the outset,
whether the student was seeking the professor's help as a lawyer or as
a teacher-mentor.' 5 Among other things, the professor's latitude to
address the problem might be different depending on her role: as a
lawyer, the professor could not disclose the student's information
without her permission, while as a teacher, the professor would have
no clear professional obligation to keep the student's information
confidential."
It might be argued that in the clinical setting, however, the
professor does not have the option of serving as the student's lawyer
and that the student should not reasonably perceive the professor to
be serving in that role. 7 The situation might be compared to one in
which a law firm associate, troubled by a case on which she is
supervised by another lawyer, seeks advice from a senior lawyer in the
firm. The associate would understand that the senior lawyer has
responsibilities to the firm's clients and fiduciary responsibilities to the
12. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 14(1)(b) (2000).
13. Cf. Tex. Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 394, reprinted in 42 TEX. B.J. 340 (1979)
(opining that
[a] lawyer who writes or speaks for the purpose of educating members of the
public to recognize their legal problems should carefully refrain from giving or
appearing to give a general solution applicable to all apparently similar
individual problems, since slight changes in fact situations may require a material
variance in the applicable advice; otherwise, the public may be misled or
misadvised).
14. See A Teacher's Trouble, supra note 10, at 316-17 (quoting Carol Lieberman).
15. See id. at 325-26 (quoting Vanessa Merton).
16. Further, as an employee of the law school, the professor may have an affirmative
duty to report the colleague's misconduct to the law school administrators. See id. at 330
(quoting a speaker from the audience).
17. Cf. id. at 333 (quoting Ted Schneyer's observation that, in role play where student
confides in professor, the professor should not think of herself as being in an attorney-
client relationship with the student, although she may nevertheless feel an "obligation of
confidentiality just because of the general expectation that this wouldn't go any farther").
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firm. Absent some agreement to the contrary, she could not
reasonably expect the senior lawyer to act as her own lawyer with
undivided loyalty to her. 8 Likewise, the law professor should be
understood to have obligations to the law school and to the law school
clinic's client.'9 One difference, however, is that, in the law school
clinic, the student is not only a lawyer but also a recipient of a
service-namely, legal education-and, therefore, the clinical faculty
have responsibilities to her as well as to the clients. Another
difference is that law students lack the sophistication of lawyer-
associates. It may therefore be understandable that, in the law clinic,
the student seeking advice from a professor may be confused about
the professor's role and the professor's responsibilities to her.0
The scenario described at the outset of this article presents the
question in a different context-neither in the classroom nor in the
law school clinic, but in the office of a law professor whose legal
practice is independent of the law school. In this scenario, BJ, the
student, expects to receive disinterested personal advice about a
problem that has legal implications and, from the student's
perspective, has nothing to do with the professor himself. Is BJ
coming to Professor White because he is a lawyer or because he is a
trusted teacher? The risk of confusion is evident. Until she is asked,
she may riot be clear in her own mind whether she is seeking legal or
18. Further, even by agreement, it is doubtful that the senior lawyer could represent
her independently of the law firm. The senior lawyer has duties to the firm, which in turn
has duties to the client. If the associate discloses that the firm's client had been
misrepresented or that another lawyer in the firm had engaged in misconduct, she should
ordinarily expect the senior lawyer to use the information for the benefit of the firm's
client (e.g., by correcting the error) and the firm. The situation would be different where
advice is sought concerning the law firm's legal or professional obligations. See, e.g.,
Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Foreword: The Legal Profession: The Impact of Law and Legal
Theory, FORDHAM L. REV. 239, 247 (1998) ("A lawyer confronting something that seems
to be an ethics problem should consult a colleague about whether there is such a problem
and, if so, how she should go about resolving it."). In that situation, disclosures would
ordinarily be confidential vis-a-vis the law firm. Cf United States v. Rowe, 96 F.3d 1294,
1297 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the attorney-client privilege attaches when a law firm
assigns its own lawyers to perform legal services for the firm as long as the firm's intent was
to receive legal advice). The situation would similarly differ when a lawyer represents
another lawyer in the firm regarding a matter that does not implicate the firm's interests
(e.g., the lawyer's will or divorce), in which case the lawyer would be entitled to expect that
confidences would be preserved.
19. Cf A Teacher's Trouble, supra note 10, at 329 (quoting Jane Aiken's observation
that, in role play, information disclosed by student to clinic professor has implications for
the clinic and its other students).
20. Cf id. at 31 (quoting Bob Dinerstein's description of role play, involving student
who tells clinical professor of another professor's misconduct, as "a learning opportunity
for the student").
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non-legal advice.
The professor's role has considerable significance. As a lawyer,
the professor would be obliged to keep the student's confidences2' and
to render legal advice that is competent.2 2 As teacher, in contrast,
Professor White will not be legally obligated and may not feel morally
obligated to keep the student's information secret. He may not feel
compelled to render "legal" advice at all, much less competent legal
advice.
Likewise, the professor's role will determine whether he may
properly take interests other than those of the student into account. If
Professor White is serving as a lawyer, he must avoid conflicts of
interest and represent the student with undivided loyalty. 3 If he is
serving as a mentor, he is subject to whatever standards of ethics apply
generally to academics and to his own personal moral standards.
Presumably, he may take into account the law school's interests as
well as his own. In any case, the standards applying to the teacher-
mentor will be less well defined than the legal profession's standards
and less likely to be enforceable.
Finally, whether the professor is serving as legal advisor or
mentor may affect the nature of the assistance he provides. If
Professor White is acting as a lawyer, he may see his task as
identifying BJ's options, analyzing the legal implications of each
option, identifying her relevant non-legal interests, and guiding her to
the option that is both legally acceptable and most consistent with her
perceived interests. If he is acting as a teacher, he may take an
altogether different approach. Professor White may see this encounter
as a teaching opportunity-an opportunity to assist BJ in identifying,
researching, and analyzing the relevant issues. Rather than placing BJ
in the role of a client, he may place her in the role of a lawyer who, as
is often the case, is substantially responsible for resolving her own
ethical problems.
Given the significance of the distinction between the two possible
roles, the legal profession's norms would suggest that, in the very
least, the professor has an obligation to clarify his role, especially if he
does not intend to serve as a lawyer. In general a lawyer may not
mislead someone to believe that the lawyer represents her or
deliberately exploit her misconception. For example, when corporate
lawyers deal with corporate officers and employees, they may have to
21. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.6(a) (2000).
22. See id. R. 1.1.
23. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 387 (1958).
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clarify that they do not represent the officer or employee personally.24
Similarly, lawyers who serve in non-lawyer roles-for example,
insurance brokers or real estate agents-may have to make clear to
the prospective client that they are not offering to provide legal
services.2  If Professor White is disinclined to serve as a lawyer and to
provide legal assistance, he may have to make that clear to his student
and discuss the implications of his role as mentor rather than lawyer.
Further, in the event that Professor White is willing to provide
legal advice to his student, he must consider how the legal profession's
conflict of interest rules apply.26 Professor White has fiduciary duties
to the law school. Absent some understanding with the law school
administration, the professor may have a duty to disclose information
learned from students that would be important to the operation of the
school.
A law school may, of course, authorize or even encourage its
faculty to serve as its students' legal advisors by stipulating that
professors do not owe the law school a disclosure obligation or an
obligation to act in the law school's interests when giving advice to
students. But it is unclear whether such a provision is desirable for the
law school. Unlike a situation where a professor represents a client
who is unconnected with the law school, a law school might consider it
inappropriate for professors to represent students. The professional
relationship between a professor and student may affect the teacher-
student relationship, causing the professor to favor the student or, if
the relationship is disclosed, causing other students to perceive
favoritism.27 The law school may also worry that the professor will
appear to be rendering assistance to the student in his capacity as a
24. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.13(e) (2000).
25. See, e.g., New York State Bar Ass'n Comm. on Prof'l Ethics, Op. 687 (1997)
(requiring lawyer acting as insurance broker to clarify role to avoid inadvertently creating
an attorney-client relationship). If the lawyer does not make this clear, then the client may
expect, for example, that what she says to the lawyer will be protected by the attorney-
client privilege.
26. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7,1.8,1.9 (2000).
27. Similar, but more serious, concerns are presented by intimate relationships
between professors and students. See Margaret H. Mack, Regulating Sexual Relationships
Between Faculty and Students, 6 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 79, 82-84 (1999) (arguing that
student-faculty sexual relationships can create favoritism in the classroom setting and
affect the dynamics of a class); Caroline Forell, What's Wrong with Faculty-Student Sex?
The Law School Context, 47 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47, 57 (1997) (explaining that many graduate
students have described that their sexual relationships with professors have included some
amount of coercion). The risk that the professor will exploit the unequal teacher-student
relationship, which is likely to be present in the case of an intimate relationship, is less
likely to be present when the, professor serves as the student's lawyer.
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law professor, in which event the law school might fairly be blamed if
the professor poorly serves the student. Even if the school would
otherwise be willing to allow faculty to represent students in some
contexts, it might be too difficult to identify what those contexts are."'
Even if the professor owes the law school no conflicting
professional obligations, he may take the law school's interests to
heart. The professor will not know whether and to what extent these
interests are implicated until the student's story unfolds. If the
student's problem involves, for example, difficulties that she is having
settling a parent's estate, these other interests are unlikely to be
implicated, and the conflict of interest rules are unlikely to apply.
Professor White's situation is quite the opposite, however. Wholly
apart from BJ's interests and legal obligations, out of concern for the
law school and what he understands to be its interests, Professor
White might be inclined to urge BJ to act consistently with the law
school's interests. He may also have personal interests that will affect
his approach to BJ's problem. For example, Professor White may be
influenced by concerns about his professional relationship with
colleagues and administrators29 or by his interest in writing about the
situation.30
28. A school might be inclined to allow its professor to represent a student only if the
matter does not implicate the law school's interests. For example, the law school might be
unconcerned if a law professor drafts a student's will or handles a student's divorce. On the
other hand, if a student confides to Professor A that she submitted a plagiarized paper to
Professor Z or that she made misrepresentations on her law school application, the student
would benefit from legal advice about whether she should turn herself in and, if so, what
further steps she should take; but it is questionable whether the law school would want its
own professor to provide this advice. Likewise, the law school might not permit a professor
to advise a student regarding a claim against the school-e.g., a personal injury claim for
injuries sustained from slipping on ice outside the school's front entrance.
29. Cf. A Teacher's Trouble, supra note 10, at 329 (quoting Jane Aiken's observation
that, in role play involving junior professor to whom student confided information about a
colleague's misconduct, junior professor has personal interests that may be affected by his
course of conduct).
30. Courts have recognized that contracts allowing attorneys to publish articles and
books about their clients may present the danger that the lawyer's representation will be
adversely affected by the lawyer's interest in the publication, particularly in high-profile
criminal cases in which the lawyers may earn a substantial income from the publication.
See United States v. Hearst, 638 F.2d 1190, 1199 (9th Cir. 1980) (remanding for a hearing
on whether F. Lee Bailey's contract to write a book about Patricia Hearst affected his
representation of her); Ray v. Rose, 491 F.2d 285, 289 (6th Cir. 1974) (addressing the
possibility that James Earl Ray's attorneys were more interested in profiting from their
articles about the case than competently representing their client); People v. Corona, 80
Cal. App. 3d 684, 720-21, 727, 145 Cal. Rptr. 894, 915-16, 920 (1978) (holding that a
conflict of interest was created when the client waived his attorney-client privilege and
granted attorney exclusive rights to the client's life story); see also MODEL RULES OF
PROF'L CONDUCr R. 1.8(d) (2000) (providing that "[p]rior to the conclusion of
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If other interests or obligations might undermine his ability to
competently advise the student, the professor must consider whether,
from an objective perspective, he can give disinterested assistance
notwithstanding these other demands and pressures. If it is not clear
he can do so, he cannot serve BJ as a lawyer.3 ' Even if he is reasonably
confident that he can give BJ disinterested legal advice, Professor
White must advise her of the risk that his judgment may be affected
by various interests other than her own and secure her informed
consent before proceeding to assist her.32
Further, even if Professor White eschews the role of lawyer, he
may be constrained in his ability to provide advice to his student
about matters implicating the law school's interests. He is, after all, a
representative of the school. Would it be fair for a representative of
the law school to serve as the student's advisor? Arguably, the
school's interests might be better served if the professor were to be
detached. CA, the student accused of wrongdoing, may have a
different account of what happened and feel that the professor and, by
extension, the school acted unfairly in forming a judgment without
hearing his side of the story. Professor White might better serve the
school as a neutral fact-finder, a role that would be inconsistent with
serving as BJ's advisor.
No doubt, law faculty are conditioned to answering students'
questions, both within and outside the classroom. Some questions are
about the law-e.g., the meaning of decisions studied in class. Some
questions relate to how the students should conduct themselves-e.g.,
how to study for exams, what courses to take, what jobs to seek, and
the like. In most situations, the professor is clearly serving as a teacher
only. On occasion, however, students seek advice relating to personal
legal problems and/or problems that implicate the institutional
interests of the law school. In such situations, there may be a question
of whether the professor can give advice at all and, if so, in what role.
Further, it may be unclear, when the student first sits down with the
professor, what role the professor will assume, what advice the
professor should give about his role, and whether the conversation
will veer off into entirely forbidden territory. Given the complexities,
should law professors entirely refrain from giving their students
advice? Law professors, of course, have a strong impulse-and
representation of a client, a lawyer shall not make or negotiate an agreement giving the
lawyer literary or media rights to a portrayal or account based in substantial part on
information relating to the representation").
31. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7(b) (2000).
32. See id.
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perhaps even a responsibility-to serve as mentors for students. The
question is how to fulfill this function in a manner that confronts its
complexities.
IV. THE ROLE OF LAW PROFESSORS AS NON-LAWYERS (I. E.,
SCHOLARS AND TEACHERS): MAY LAW PROFESSORS BRING THEIR
LEGAL EXPERIENCE TO BEAR ON THEIR SCHOLARSHIP AND
TEACHING?
If one believed, like Shaw, that those who cannot do, teach, it
would be professionally impermissible for law professors to practice
law. Wholly apart from the standards of academic ethics, the legal
profession's standards are clear: a lawyer may not represent a client
ineptly.33 If, as some may suspect, law professors teach law because
they cannot "do" law, then law professors must keep away from
clients to avoid "doing" law badly. Thus, in the scenario at the outset
of this article, Professor White would have to avoid giving his student
legal advice because, although licensed to practice law, he was not
qualified to do so.
Apparently, however, the legal academy does not accept Shaw's
aphorism as invariably true. The clearest proof is that the academy
has endorsed law school clinics. If clinical professors were assumed to
be invariably bad lawyers, no one would let them loose on clients.
Likewise, the employment of some quite distinguished practitioners as
adjunct professors suggests that law teachers are not presumed to be
bad lawyers. Of course, one possible rejoinder is that good lawyers
make bad teachers.
There is plenty of anecdotal evidence that even law professors
who work primarily outside the clinic are not necessarily bad lawyers.
Some non-clinical professors are outstanding lawyers, and some are
reputed to be outstanding lawyers, teachers, and scholars at the same
time. Laurence Tribe, Kathleen Sullivan, and Michael Tigar are
among those who come readily to mind. Indeed, it is only relatively
recently that legal academia seems to have become a separate career
path for individuals with a scholarly bent who are incapable of
practicing law, and some would argue that, even today, law schools
should remain receptive to hiring individuals who, besides having
potential to be excellent scholars and teachers, are also (imagine!)
good lawyers. Some might even indulge the heretical notion that
33. See, e.g., id. R. 1.1 ("A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a
client.").
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experience in practicing successfully is an important credential for a
law professor, because a law school's raison d'etre is to prepare
students to practice law, and it is therefore necessary for a law teacher
to have first-hand knowledge of what it means to practice law well.
And, at the risk of being burned at the stake (at least, metaphorically),
one might even extend the argument further to suggest that, since law
professors' memories of their pre-academic experience may fade or
become increasingly irrelevant as the nature of law practice changes,
there may be reason to encourage law professors to dip their toes
back in the water from time to time.
Of course, there are some legal academics-and here, the word"academics" might be stressed-for whom actual practice is
anathema. They identify more strongly with academia than with the
legal profession. They do not regard law schools as professional
schools but as academic units within universities whose primary
mission is the development and dissemination of knowledge, useful or
otherwise. Often, they see teaching as the price to pay for the
opportunity to be handsomely supported (much better, of course, than
their peers in other departments of the university) while they engage
in scholarship and attend scholarly conferences and colloquia. (When
it comes to justifying their higher salaries, however, they would not be
above pointing out that their law school classmates are making much
more money in practice and that, without higher salaries, they might
be tempted to enter law practice as well-a dubious proposition!)
These tend to be professors who are teaching at ivy league or
otherwise top-ranked schools, or who wish they were. Their attitude is
responsible, in part, for what Judge Harry Edwards, himself a former
law professor, once termed "the growing disjunction between legal
education and the legal profession.""
This group of professors has some antipathy toward law practice
by law professors. It is bad enough that their graduates have to do it.
But perish the thought that their colleagues should practice law! It is
to reduce an academic department to the rank of a trade school!
Other professors who do not entirely share this antipathy may have
some ambivalence about whether law professors should be practicing
what they teach.
The antipathy or ambivalence about law professors practicing law
34. Harry T. Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the
Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34, 34 (1992); but see James L. Oakes, Commentary on
Judge Edwards' "The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal
Profession," 91 MICH. L. REV. 2163, 2166 (1993) (questioning whether the gap is as large
as Judge Edwards believes).
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may or may not explain periodic expressions of concern about the
impact of law practice on legal scholarship.35 In any case, the concern
ought to be weighed seriously regardless of what may motivate those
who raise it. The concern is, in essence, that law practice will pollute
one's academic scholarship, at least insofar as one practices in an area
that has some bearing on one's scholarship. The concern may be cast
in terms of academic ethics: a professor's academic objectivity is
diminished when he engages in scholarship on subjects relating to his
law practice.
This can be understood as another aspect of the law school as an
MDP. There may be a clash between the professional norms and
obligations of legal scholars, on one hand, and lawyers, on the other.
When professors move back and forth between roles-teaching and
scholarship, on one hand, and legal practice, on the other-they may
apply the wrong norms. Or they may let the interests of their law
practice affect how they perform their non-lawyering work.36
This concern was expressed in Rebecca Eisenberg's 1993 article
The Scholar as Advocate, published in the Journal of Legal
Education,37 followed by responses by Stephen Gillers," John R.
Kramer," and Robert Pitofsky.0 This concern was also the impetus for
35. See, e.g., Robert B. McKay, Ethical Standards for Law Teachers, 25 ARK. L. REV.
44, 49-50 (1971); Norman Redlich, On the Professional Responsibility of Law School
Teachers, 29 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 623, 623-24 (1982); James B. Stewart, Extracurricular
Work by Law Professors Is Source of Controversy, WALL ST. J., Mar. 1, 1984, at 1.
36. Another concern, unrelated to the concern about academic objectivity, is that law
professors who have both a teaching and publishing load may not devote sufficient time to
either, so both will suffer. See Marin Roger Scordato, The Dualist Model of Legal Teaching
and Scholarship, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 367,385 (1990).
37. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Scholar as Advocate, 43 J. LEGAL EDUc. 391, 392-93
(1993). Eisenberg espoused the view that law professors' work as lawyers may negatively
affect their scholarly work: "The role of advocate calls for constructing persuasive
arguments that will generate favorable outcomes for clients. This is very different from the
function they perform as scholars-the function that justifies their academic freedom-of
saying what they think" to please existing clients or to attract new ones. Id. at 393. Another
is that the lawyer may find himself changing his opinions or beliefs, convinced by his own
arguments, without even realizing it is happening. Id. at 393-94.
Eisenberg proposed that scholars disclose if they are writing on behalf of a client
or organization:
An advocate admittedly speaks on behalf of a client, while a legal scholar usually
purports to speak for herself, whatever her underlying values may be. At the very
least, if a legal scholar's views are in fact the product of a client's interests, her
audience will want to know that.
Id. at 397. She urged the scholarly community to adopt these disclosures as norms, even
though clients may protest. Id. at 399-400. See also Paul T. Hayden, Professional Conflict
of Interest in "Good Practice" in Legal Education, 50 J. LEGAL EDUC. 358 (2000).
38. Stephen Gillers, Against the Wall, 43 J. LEGAL EDUC. 405 (1993).
39. John R. Kramer, Comment on Rebecca Eisenberg's "The Scholar as Advocate," 43
2001]
SOUTH TEXAS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 42:301
a program of the Association of American Law Schools ("AALS") in
January 2000," which centered on a proposed amendment to the
AALS Statement of Good Practices by Law Professors in the
Discharge of their Ethical and Professional Responsibilities (the"Statement" or "AALS Statement").42 The current Statement calls for
J. LEGAL EDUC. 401 (1993).
40. Robert Pitofsky, Comment on Rebecca Eisenberg's "The Scholar as Advocate," 43
J. LEGAL EDUC. 412 (1993).
41. Committee Proposing New Statement of Good Practices, NEWSLETTER (AALS,
Washington, D.C.), Nov. 1999, at 18.
42. See id. The current Statement of Good Practices by Law Professors in the
Discharge of their Ethical and Professional Responsibilities contains the following
paragraph about academic integrity in scholarship:
A law professor has a responsibility to preserve the integrity and independence
of legal scholarship. Sponsored or remunerated research should always be
acknowledged with full disclosure of the interests of the parties. If views
expressed in an article were also espoused in the course of representation of a
client or in consulting, this should be acknowledged.
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN OF LAW SCHOOLS, STATEMENT OF GOOD PRACTICES BY
LAW PROFESSORS IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR ETHICAL AND PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES (1989), available at http://www.aals.org/ethic.html (last visited July 9,
2001) (hereinafter, "THE STATEMENT").
Additionally, along the same lines, the current Statement provides that "[ijf a
professor expresses views in class that were espoused in representing a client or in
consulting, the professor should make appropriate disclosure." Id.
The proposed Draft Statement would require additional disclosures, as follows:
A law professor has a responsibility to preserve the integrity and
independence of legal scholarship, teaching, and all other activities undertaken in
the professorial capacity. A law professor should disclose the material facts
relating to any personal economic interest that the professor has in any book,
article, other written work of any length, press interview, conference
presentation, and classroom or other teaching that the professor undertakes in
that capacity. If views expressed in a written work, interview or conference
presentation, or teaching were also espoused in the course of representation of a
client or in consulting, this fact should also be disclosed, whether or not the work
was compensated.
Disclosure of material facts relating to an economic interest should include,
at a minimum, disclosure of (1) the amount of money received (or to be
received) directly or indirectly, in connection with the writing, interview or
conference presentation, or teaching, or in connection with the espousal or
research of ideas expressed within the written work, interview or conference
presentation, or teaching from any source; (2) the identity of any such funding
source, including any relationship with the topic that the funding source has,
which would not be apparent to the reader, listener, or student; (3) any
conditions imposed or expected by the funding source on future writing,
interviews or conference presentations, or teaching. As to money which the
professor reasonably expects to receive but which has not been received at the
time a written work is published, an interview given, a conference presentation
made, or teaching undertaken, she should make a good faith estimate of the
total, provide a range of possible payment amounts, or describe the payment
method to be used to calculate her compensation.
LAW SCHOOLS AS MDPS
disclosure whenever research is financially supported as well as
whenever, in academic writing or law school teaching, law professors
express views that "were also espoused in the course of representation
of a client or in consulting." 3 The revised version would, in addition,
require extensive disclosure concerning any economic interest that the
professor has in a written work or presentation. Like model rules of
professional conduct, the AALS Statement serves only as a guideline
unless it is adopted by individual law schools to govern the conduct of
their faculty. But law schools might feel some pressure to adopt the
AALS Statement, since they recently assumed an obligation under
American Bar Association ("ABA") accreditation rules to adopt
policies on faculty responsibilities," and the AALS Statement offers
an obvious model.
One short answer to the problem addressed by both the present
AALS Statement and the proposed additions might be, "who cares
whether legal scholarship is objective?" Legal scholarship that is not
objective might be pretty good nonetheless. Laurence Tribe, for
example, argues constitutional questions as an appellate advocate. He
also authors a treatise on constitutional law.4 The existing AALS
Statement assumes that, if he addresses the same constitutional
question in both contexts, his experience as an advocate may shape
the views he offers in his treatise. The revised Statement assumes that
the prospect of receiving royalties from the treatise may also influence
his views. If so, doesn't the evidence suggest that the influence is not
negative, but to the good? Professor Tribe is one of the nation's most
highly regarded constitutional advocates, and his treatise is regarded
as one of the most outstanding scholarly works in the field.
Of course, it is unfair to offer up Professor Tribe as the typical
lawyer-scholar. But even for many lesser lights in legal academia,
To the extent possible, all disclosures discussed in this draft policy should be
made by the professor when she first submits a written work for publication or
begins an interview, conference presentation, or relevant class discussion. When
a professor is invited to produce written work for a publication or is invited to
participate in a conference or other oral presentation, the professor should make
the disclosures discussed in this draft policy at the earliest possible time.
Committee Proposing New Statement of Good Practices, supra note 41.
43. THE STATEMENT, supra note 42.
44. ABA Standard 404(a) of ABA STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS
provides that "[a] law school shall establish policies with respect to a full-time faculty
member's responsibilities in teaching, scholarship, service to the law school community,
and professional activities outside the law school," and requires that the policies address,
among other things, "[r]esearch and scholarship, and integrity in the conduct of
scholarship ...."
45. LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 1988).
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there may be an advantage to thinking about law and legal institutions
from the perspective of a lawyer as well as a scholar. Professors who
practice may be in a position to offer better, more credible
understandings of the law, legal processes, and legal institutions.46
Pure scholars may be more inclined to espouse views that are fanciful,
extreme, or otherwise ungrounded in reality. A law professor who has
to develop a view when there is something at stake may better
understand the relevant considerations, may have more empathy for
those whose interests are implicated, and may work harder to get the
right answer. Further, having experienced the lawyer's perspective,
the professor may have a fuller appreciation of the problem when he
later analyzes it from a scholarly perspective. For example, if
Professor White were to write about the ethical obligations of law
professors, law students, and law student volunteer organizations, he
might have a richer perspective after advising BJ about these subjects
than he would have had before she came in his door. Further,
regardless of whether his scholarship would be better for having
considered these questions as a lawyer, his scholarship would be
different, and might therefore make a different and additional,
contribution to the body of academic literature generated by non-
practitioners dealing with the same subjects.47
One might argue, further, that good legal scholarship is not
necessarily objective in the sense that the AALS Statement seems to
presuppose. Does anyone think that when law professors begin to
examine questions from a scholarly perspective, they do so without a
legal philosophy or a point of view? Even judges, though required to
be unbiased, are permitted-even expected-to have a judicial
philosophy, perhaps even one shaped by their experience in practice
before assuming the bench.48
46. It might be supposed that professional experience will not only improve a
professor's scholarship, but also his teaching, since he can bring his own personal
experiences into the classroom. Kramer writes in his response to Eisenberg's article: "I
brought [my] experiences and values back to class and talked about them openly. I didn't
need war stories when I had real hypotheticals to dangle before the students in my role as
advocate-teacher. I had frontline constitutional questions to translate from the classroom
into law." Kramer, supra note 39, at 404.
47. See Pitofsky, supra note 40, at 414.
48. Philip J. Grib, S.J., The Ethical Foundations of Judicial Decision-Making, 35
CATH. LAW. 1, 15-16 (1991) (describing how judges, like everyone, make decisions based
on a variety of factors, including personal ones); Donald C. Nugent, Judicial Bias, 42 CLEV.
ST. L. REV. 1 (1994) (noting how difficult it is for an attorney to have a judge disqualified
for personal bias or prejudice); Cheryl L. Wade, When Judges Are Gatekeepers:
Democracy, Morality, Status, and Empathy in Duty Decisions (Help from Ordinary
Citizens), 80 MARQ. L. REV. 1, 17-25 (1996) (noting that judges' life experiences and
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Law is not, after all, a science. Law professors are not performing
experiments in a laboratory, recording the results, and analyzing
them. Their research is almost always from publicly available material
such as judicial decisions, statutes, administrative regulations,
legislative history, and secondary literature. " Their research is
therefore easy to replicate, and their raw material is easily
understandable so that readers need not rely on the objectivity of law
professors when they report and analyze their data. Further, given the
accessibility of these materials, law professors can easily be caught if
they misrepresent the writings on which they rely and, therefore, have
a strong disincentive to do so.
Nor is there a risk that readers will put undeserved weight on law
professors' analyses based on the understanding that, as may be the
case in scientific research, an objective analysis should yield a single
result. Like judges, law professors formulate opinions based on the
raw material of the law. No one believes that disinterested, objective
law professors and judges should always come to the same opinion,
however. The tools of legal analysis do not work the same as those of
mathematical or, arguably, scientific analysis. Consequently, from
their first days of law school, lawyers are trained to read skeptically.
We call the output of judges "opinions" for a reason. Judicial
decisions are sometimes put in casebooks precisely because the
casebook authors believe they are wrongly decided and would be
good teaching tools, not because they are exemplars of legal
reasoning. If judges are expressing an opinion on the law, legal
academics are doing so all the more. There is little risk that readers
will be misled to believe that a law professor's opinion is gospel.
Like judges, law professors in their scholarship and teaching
should strive to be "objective" in the sense that they should form their
views without regard to whether they or another party will profit by
them. Like judges, however, objective and disinterested law professors
will often form different views on tough questions of law. It is unclear
whether prior professional work, whether or not for pay, will skew (as
opposed to "inform") law professors' scholarship. We do not assume
that judges are impermissibly biased when they decide cases relating
to legal issues they addressed in their prior practice. Nor, for that
matter, do we require judges to disclose when legal views expressed in
their opinions were previously espoused on behalf of clients.
personal beliefs are always present in their work).
49. An exception might be made for law professors who are legal historians and
social scientists.
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When a law professor's previous role was as advisor or expert
witness, ideally, the earlier views themselves will have been objective,
in the same sense in which legal scholarship is objective. When the
previous role was as litigator, the previously advocated views will not
have been objective, but neither will they necessarily be the lawyer's
own views. The professional norms assume that lawyers can advocate
viewpoints for clients that they do not personally share" and develop
and preserve viewpoints different from those of their clients.' As Dr.
Johnson observed,
Everybody knows you are paid for affecting warmth for your
client; and it is, therefore, properly no dissimulation; the
moment you come from the bar you resume your usual
behavior. Sir, a man will no more carry the artifice of the bar
into the common intercourse of society, than a man who is paid
for tumbling upon his hands will continue to tumble upon his
hands when he should walk on his feet. 2
Of course, if a law professor genuinely comes to sympathize with
views espoused on behalf of a client, it is uncertain why those views
should then deserve less weight than views arrived at by a different
route. Law professors come to their views in various ways, including in
response to experiences whose impact may not be obvious even to the
professor. Why single out one set of experiences? As long as
academics espouse their genuine beliefs, the process by which they
form them might seem to be beside the point.
Perhaps in part for these reasons, no one to my knowledge has
concluded that all law professors must refrain from practicing law or
that, if they practice law, they must practice exclusively in areas
different from those in which they write and teach. (Indeed, a
professor's value as a lawyer or consultant would be vastly diminished
if he were confined to practicing outside the areas in which he became
especially knowledgeable through teaching and scholarship.)
Undoubtedly, some law professors have decided not to practice law,
even though they may be qualified to do so, out of concern about the
impact of their law practice on the quality of their academic work.
But, it appears to be generally accepted that there is a place in legal
50. Cf. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(b) (2000).
51. See, e.g., N.Y.C. Ass'n B. Comm. Prof'l Jud. Ethics, Op. 1997-3 (allowing a lawyer
to lobby for or against legislation or otherwise publicly espouse a personal viewpoint
adverse to the interests of a present client in a pending matter as long as client confidences
and zealous representation of the client are not compromised).
52. I1 JAMES BOSWELL, LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON,'L.L.D. 45 (Yale University
Press, 1994).
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academia for practicing lawyers.
Instead, the discussion has focused on whether and to what extent
law professors should have to disclose in their writings and classes that
they are addressing subjects that relate, in any of various ways, to
their work as lawyers. Law professors have largely been governed by
their own good sense and discretion, as guided (if they are aware of it)
by the AALS Statement. The current proposal would encourage more
extensive disclosure, not with the avowed aim of discouraging law
professors from practicing law, but as an expression of what is thought
to be required of all law professors as a matter of candor. The idea is
that, absent broader disclosure, the lawyer-professor will be
withholding information that readers and students are entitled to
know when they evaluate the professor's views.
No one would dispute that, from the perspective of legal ethics as
well as academic ethics, disclosure sometimes should be made. In
particular, law professors should not mislead readers about the
capacity in which they are writing. They should be clear about
whether they are writing as a lawyer on behalf of a client, or as an
expert witness retained by a client, rather than in their independent
capacity as a scholar. Generally, however, the law professor's role will
be sufficiently clear from the context. When a professor signs a legal
brief, for example, it is ordinarily clear whether or not he represents a
party. 3 Likewise, when a professor testifies as an expert witness, it is
ordinarily clear whether he has been retained by a party. When
professors put their name on a book or academic article, it will
ordinarily be understood that they are expressing their independent
professional views and have not been retained by a client. If that is not
true, a law professor should make a disclosure. Thus, if a client hires a
lawyer (whether for pay or otherwise) to write an article taking a
particular position on a subject, the law professor should make that
clear, even if the views expressed in the article happen to coincide
with the law professor's independent views. The obligation to avoid
misleading the reader would seem to be required as a matter of legal
ethics, if not academic ethics. Likewise, if a law professor serves in a
dual role in a case, he should disclose both roles and make clear in
what capacity he is serving when he writes or speaks about the case.
For example, when a law professor writes an article about a case in
53. For example, if a lawyer testifies in the legislature on behalf of a client, the lawyer
must make that plain; otherwise, it will appear that the lawyer is appearing on his own
behalf. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 3.9 (2000). The same principle should
apply in legal academic writing.
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which he represents a party, he should disclose that he serves in a
lawyer capacity 4 Even if the professor is not being paid to write the
particular article, his duties of loyalty55 and confidentiality56 would
limit his ability to write with candor and objectivity concerning a
current client. If the writing relates to a pending matter in which one
represents a client, the professor's duties as a lawyer restrict him from
taking a position harmful to the client's position. Therefore, an article
specifically addressing a pending matter in which the law professor
represents a party is, almost perforce, a work of advocacy. 7
The question is how far the disclosure obligation should go.
Suppose a party commissions a law professor to write a paper on a
subject but says, "Write whatever you believe to be true." Suppose a
party says, "Write a paper on anything you want, and we'll give you
financial support." Must the professor disclose? Does the answer
depend on whether the party has a stake in the outcome of the
research-e.g., whether the support is coming from the professor's
university or law school, from the government, from a foundation, or
from a corporation? Here, the concern is that money changes
everything. One might be influenced by the money to take a particular
view, even if the ground rules are that the professor can take any view
he wants-even an objective one. A reader, it might be argued, is
entitled to know that the lawyer is being supported, because the
reader will then read the work more carefully or skeptically or entirely
discount it.
54. For example, Yale law professor George L. Priest's op-ed piece about the
Microsoft antitrust litigation, Some Kind of Remedy, identified him as a Microsoft
consultant. See N.Y. TIMES, June 9, 2000, at A31. Similarly, Harvard law professor Charles
Fried disclosed his position as counsel in United States v. Morrison, the subject of his op-ed
piece, Good Causes Make Bad Law, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2000, at A27.
55. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2000).
56. See id. R. 1.6.
57. Recently, the faculty of Fordham University School of Law adopted a Faculty
Responsibilities Code that largely incorporated the existing AALS code but did not
include the obligations to disclose whenever views expressed in teaching and scholarship
were previously espoused in a representation. Instead, the faculty adopted a narrower
requirement, as follows: "If views expressed in an article or other writing relate to a
pending matter in which the professor has represented a client and the writing may affect
the client's interests in the matter, the professor's role as counsel should be
acknowledged." Fordham University School of Law, Faculty Responsibilities Code (2000).
My understanding is that the provision was proposed by a professor, Bruce A. Green, who
was then engaged in scholarship on the question of whether law professors should be
required to disclose prior legal work that bears on their scholarship and teaching. History
does not record whether, at the time he proposed the provision, Professor Green made
adequate disclosure that his conduct in faculty governance implicated his ongoing work as
a scholar.
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Some might argue that the disclosure obligation should be
extended further. Any present or prior associations that might make
the writing other than objective must be disclosed, regardless of
whether it expresses views that were previously "espoused" in prior
work. Is the professor writing on criminal law or procedure after
having served as a prosecutor or defense lawyer, on civil procedure or
evidence after having served as a civil litigator, or on administrative
law after having served in an administrative agency? Has the
professor attended seminars at which other participants advocated
viewpoints relevant to the professor's scholarship or, even worse, has
the professor formed a friendship with individuals holding relevant
views? Is the professor's law school funded by any organization that
might have an interest in the professor's scholarship or, of even
greater moment, has such an organization funded the professor's chair
or academic center and thus, at least indirectly, the professor's
scholarship? If so, the argument goes, the professor's views may be
distorted; so the reader must be told.
And why disclose only to readers? What about to students? It
may be supposed that they are expecting an objective disquisition on
the law. They might be misled to believe that their professors are
objective-e.g., that Monroe Freedman is a tabula rasa on issues of
litigation ethics or that Alan Dershowitz has no prior views on
questions of criminal procedure. Therefore, whatever disclosure rules
apply to legal scholarship must apply equally to classroom teaching.
The debate in the pages of the Journal of Legal Education was a
healthy one which encouraged law professors to consider whether, as
a matter of independent moral judgment, they should disclose certain
potential influences on their scholarship.58 The recent AALS program
performed a similar function. This approach is consistent with the
view of legal ethics scholars such as William Simon, that lawyers in
general ought to be encouraged to engage in independent moral
decision making. 9 It is also consistent with an understanding of the
importance of discourse on contested questions of professional
conduct as a way of developing better understandings of how
58. See supra note 37 and accompanying text; supra note 38; supra note 39; supra
note 40.
59. See, e.g., David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in
Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 31-32 (1995);' WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE
PRACTICE OF JUSTICE 74, 138 (1998) (arguing that rather than applying rules adopted by
lawyers collectively, lawyers "should take those actions that, considering the relevant
circumstances of the particular case, seem likely to promote justice").
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professionals should behave.' And it reflects an appreciation that
determining the most appropriate course of conduct may require, in
any given situation, a nuanced judgment, rather than the application
of a categorical rule. On the other hand, a rule (whether or not
enforceable) that divests law professors of discretion may carry
unintended costs.
To begin with, there are costs for legal academia and legal
scholarship in general. A rule requiring a law professor to disclose
when views expressed in teaching or scholarship were previously"espoused" in the professor's legal work will discourage law
professors from drawing on their prior professional work. That is
because the disclosure rule will be read as an expression of a
consensus within the legal academy that views developed by law
professors in a professional capacity are suspect and less worthy of
respect than views developed by scholars in a professional vacuum.
Initial disclosure made pursuant to such a rule, rather than
voluntarily, will carry with it the implication that, from the legal
academy's perspective, the views that follow should be discounted.
Whether views expressed in prior legal work are entitled to less
weight is highly questionable, however. One might even argue the
opposite-that law professors serving as consultants are likely to form
views that are more deeply considered and more genuinely believed,
knowing that their views will be relied on by a client, whereas a law
professor engaged in teaching or scholarship will feel freer to take an
extreme or speculative approach. Likewise, one might argue that law
professors as expert witnesses will take greater care, knowing that
they will be subject to cross-examination. Even if the professor takes
equal care in any context, when the law professor elaborates on the
views that originated in professional work, the resulting lecture or
scholarly writing may be richer for having a personal appreciation of
the context in which the issues arise. Until there is clearer proof that
teaching and scholarship that occur in a vacuum are invariably
superior, it may seem wrong for the AALS to derogate work that
draws on professors' law practice.
Additionally, there may be costs for law professors individually.
There may be legitimate reasons why law professors might be
disinclined to identify the professional work that may have helped
60. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green & Nancy Coleman, Ethical Issues in Representing Older
Clients, 28 CLEARINGHOUSE 658,961, 980 n.57 (1994).
61. See Steven R. Salbu, Law and Conformity, Ethics and Conflict. The Trouble with
Law-Based Conceptions of Ethics, 68 IND. L.J. 101, 104-05 (1992).
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shape their understanding of the legal issues about which they write
and teach.
As a lawyer, a professor may feel an obligation to his clients to
avoid discussing their legal problems in a way that may embarrass or
otherwise upset them. For example, in the earlier scenario, Professor
White may be concerned that his student will feel that he has abused
her trust if, in the course of writing or lecturing about the questions
raised by her experience, he calls attention to the fact that he dealt
with these questions in his work as a lawyer. To be sure, there are
many law professors, including many clinicians, whose scholarship
refers explicitly to their former clients, who may be disguised by the
use of pseudonyms or initials.62 And clients, if they know that their
lawyer writes and teaches on the subject of the representation, might
anticipate that legal issues in the representation may later find their
way into his lectures or scholarship. Even so, law professors may feel
that in some circumstances it is unfair to the client to call attention to
the prior representation.63
Additionally, the professor may feel uncomfortable putting
himself, and his professional biography, at the center of his
scholarship and teaching. The reason may not be that the professor
seeks to cultivate a false sense of objectivity. It may simply be that the
professor is more modest than most.
The professor may also feel that, at best, the inclusion of
biographical data will distract the reader or student from his ideas. At
worst, referring to his prior professional work, with the implication
that his objectivity has been compromised as a result, will invite
readers and students unfairly to ignore or discount his arguments by
attributing them to personal or professional bias, rather than
encountering his arguments on their own terms.6 Granted, there is a
62. Indeed, a whole body of legal academic scholarship has developed around the
question of the proper use of client narratives in legal scholarship. See, e.g., Cathy Lesser
Mansfield, Deconstructing Reconstructive Poverty Law: A Practice-Based Critique of the
Storytelling Aspects of the Theoretics of Practice Movement, 61 BROOKLYN L. REV. 889,
891-93 (1995). This body of scholarship provides another example of self-referential
inquiry into the general subject of law professors' ethics. It is perhaps not too uncharitable
to suggest that writings on the subject of "reconstructive poverty law" and "the theoretics
of practice," insofar as they focus on the proper scholarly use of client narratives, do not do
much to break down barriers between legal academia and the profession.
63. See Carol Shields, Writers on Writing: Opting for Invention over the Injury of
Invasion, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10, 2000, at El (urging writers to write fictional characters,
rather than thinly disguise their family and friends in fiction, in order to avoid conflicts and
hurt feelings).
64. By way of example, in a recent book about the legal profession and legal ethics,
the authors discuss the effort to persuade the American Law Institute to adopt a provision
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fair likelihood that a professor's scholarly views are influenced by his
prior experience, including what he has been taught, what he has read,
where and for whom he has worked, and maybe even with whom he
has intimate encounters. The professor's scholarly views may also be
influenced by his interests, desires, and motivations-for example, the
interest in being published in a top-flight journal or being invited to a
particular academic conference. If the professor later becomes
famous-e.g., if he is later appointed to the Supreme Court-all this
will be fair game for future biographers. In the meantime, however,
the professor may believe that his readers and students are not
entitled to engage in the intellectual equivalent of an archeological
dig-or, at least, that they are not entitled to his assistance if they
undertake to do so. He may believe, philosophically, that it is unfair to
a scholar to focus on his motivations rather than the ideas he
expresses and that no scholar is obliged to invite readers and students
to derogate his ideas by identifying possible influences that can be
used to explain the ideas away.65
A professor who was disinclined to disclose prior professional
work might either ignore the AALS Statement altogether or read its
in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS that would favor
insurance companies. RICHARD ZITRIN & CAROL M. LANGFORD, THE MORAL COMPASS
OF THE AMERICAN LAWYER 139 (1999). As they describe,
[L]awyers wrote articles and position papers in various journals expressing their
views. Primary among them was Professor Charles Silver of the University of
Texas, a recognized expert on insurance law whose work was funded by two
insurance organizations.
Id. at 139. The reference to Professor Silver's source of funding might be read to imply that
he either did not believe his own views and was passing them off as genuine when they
were really bought and paid for, or that he was influenced by the insurance companies'
funding to adopt views that, although genuine, were not the ones he would have formed if
he were writing without any expectation of financial compensation. It is at least as likely,
however, that Professor Silver was entirely uninfluenced by the funding in forming his
views, and that the companies decided to fund his research because they knew that his
independent beliefs were generally consistent with their own. In any case, the book's
reference invites readers to discount the professor's views without analyzing them and
determining why they may be unworthy. See also id. at 187 (discussing Harvard law
professor Arthur Miller's views about secret settlements and noting that his work was
supported by a foundation of the Product Liability Defense Council).
65. It is, of course, quite common in the public sphere to attack a person's views by
derogating their imagined motivations and supposed biases and to identify elements of a
person's background to which motivations or biases might be ascribed. See, e.g., John M.
Broder, A Trial Lawyer Who Is Linked to Jesse Helms, N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2000, at A8
(after prosecutor recommended that an independent counsel be appointed to investigate
Vice President Gore, Democratic party officials questioned his impartiality based on his
prior contribution to a conservative Republican candidate). The desire to avoid being
subject to this inquisition might explain why some lawyers, including law professors, avoid
the public sphere.
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disclosure provision narrowly. The current AALS Statement calls for
disclosure only when views expressed in scholarship were previously"espoused" by the professor in the course of prior professional work.'
Professor White might conclude that, although any article he writes
will have been influenced by his experience in helping BJ with her
problem, his current views were not "espoused" in the course of
providing such assistance, and therefore no disclosure is necessary.
Alternatively, a professor may attempt to avoid expressing
personal views in writing and teaching. Suppose, for example, that
Professor White were invited to participate in a symposium on law
professors' ethics and wanted to draw on his earlier experience. One
way to do so would be to attribute any views expressed in his article to
a pseudonymous law professor in order to underscore that the views
were not necessarily his own. So, for example, Professor White, after
an explanatory preface, might offer the contribution of a fictional
counterpart-say, a Professor Green-and begin with an appropriate
reference to Boswell (referring to Johnson (referring to Bacon)), as
follows.
REFLECTIONS ON THE ETHICS OF LEGAL
ACADEMICS: LAW SCHOOLS AS MDPs; OR,
SHOULD LAW PROFESSORS PRACTICE WHAT
THEY TEACH?
BRUCE A. GREEN
[A member of the House of Commons said in Samuel
Johnson's presence] that he paid no regard to the arguments of
counsel at the bar of the House of Commons, because they were
paid for speaking. JOHNSON. 'Nay, Sir, argument is argument.
You cannot help paying regard to their arguments, if they are
good. If it were testimony, you might disregard it, if you knew
that it were purchased. There is a beautiful image in Bacon
upon this subject: testimony is like an arrow shot from a long
bow; the force of it depends on the hand that draws it.
Argument is like an arrow from a cross-bow, which has equal
66. THE STATEMENT, supra note 42.
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force though shot by a child."
1. IV JAMES BOSWELL, LIFE OF SAMUEL JOHNSON, L.L.D. 281 (Yale University
Press, 1994).
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